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IMMIGRATION
Asylum Ruling Halts Restrictions in New Rule
On Nov. 19, Judge Susan Illston of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held that a new asylum rule exceeded the power of both the attorney general and the Department 
of Homeland Security and issued a nationwide temporary restraining order against the rule’s implementation. The rule had imposed blanket, categorical bars on asylum for a whole host of 
crimes and conduct—such as all felonies, most uses of false identi cation and aiding close family members entering the U.S.—that had previously lacked this harsh effect. Illston cited on page 
21 an amicus curiae brief in which I, along with Penn State Law professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and Susan Krumplitsch of DLA Piper, served as co-counsel for immigration law scholars. 
Illston held that the new rule’s restrictions con icted with the protections for asylum in the Immigration and Nationality Act by failing to provide a concrete and speci c explanation for adding 
to the range of conduct that barred asylum. In addition, Illston found that in issuing the  nal rule in October, the attorney general and the Department of Homeland Security had shifted their 
regulatory rationale and “changed course” from the authorities relied on in the proposed rule issued about a year ago. In the proposed rule, the attorney general and the Department of 
Homeland Security had relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for authority to designate certain crimes as “particularly serious” offenses that justi ed 
denying asylum. However, in the  nal rule, the attorney general and the Department of Homeland Security disclaimed reliance on this authority and, instead, relied solely on a neighboring 
subsection, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(C), which allows the attorney general to limit asylum in ways that are “consistent with” the asylum provision. 
According to the court, that shifting rationale amounted to an agency bait and switch. The shift confused stakeholders who, under the “notice and comment” procedure of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, commented on the proposed rule’s  t with the attorney general’s authority to designate certain crimes as “particularly serious.” The attorney general and the Department of 
Homeland Security had already put potential sources of comments at a disadvantage with an unusually tight 30-day deadline for comments around the 2019 holiday season, instead of the more 
usual 60-day comment period. 
The agencies’ abrupt and unexplained pivot also meant that the attorney general and the Department of Homeland Security had “failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,” Illston 
writes on page 30, citing the Supreme Court’s prominent administrative law decision, Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Company (1983). Illston found that the 
attorney general and the Department of Homeland Security had neglected to consider whether the speci c crimes and acts listed in the new rule  t the nature and impact of offenses 
considered to be “particularly serious” crimes. The language of the “particularly serious crime” provision—notably the adverb, “particularly”—suggested the need for a  nding that the crime or 
conduct had either a special nature or an impact on public safety. According to the court, adding crimes and conduct that would not  t under the “particularly serious crime” rubric is not 
“consistent with” the asylum provision. 
Perhaps the attorney general and the Department of Homeland Security could have explained how the new additions  t, but they failed to provide an explanation. Instead, they merely offered 
the conclusory claim, listed on page 29, that the new crimes and conduct were “similar” to crimes that were “particularly serious.” For Illston, that unsupported claim of similarity was not an 
adequate substitute for concrete analysis of the new rule’s litany of crimes and conduct. 
Illston will hold a hearing on Dec. 9 on the challenger’s motion for a preliminary injunction against the rule. 
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